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Abstract: Capital controls have been adopted by emerging economies to change the volume and
the composition of capital flows and to protect the economy from sudden stops. The effectiveness
measured by empirical studies has remained inconclusive, due to the limitation of the available
data. This paper adopts a theoretical model to examine whether capital controls could achieve
these goals effectively. Consequently, this paper finds that capital controls on outflows and inflows
may not achieve the goals on changing the volume and the composition of capital flows and on
protecting the economy from banking crises and sudden stops. To be more specific, controls on
capital outflows and inflows could change the volume of capital flows at the time when the controls
are imposed. However, the ability of capital controls on changing composition of capital flows and
to protect the country from banking crises and sudden stops is limited, regardless of symmetric
or asymmetric controls across countries. It is concluded that capital controls may not be the way
to protect the economy from sudden stops. It is overcoming the liquidity problems and offering
affordable rates, rather than competitive rates, that are crucial to protect the economy from crises
and sudden stops.
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1 Introduction
Capital controls have been adopted widely before 1970s, and have been relaxed gradually to promote
flows. Since 1990s and before the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, quite a few countries adopted
capital controls again [Edwards (2009), Johnson et al (2007)]. During this period, most controls
were on inflows, such as Thailand, Malaysia,Philippines, Indonedia, Czech Republic, Colombia, and
Brazil, and one contry which started controlling outflows was Spain. After the crisis in 1997, more
countries, such as Argentina, have joined the group to controls capital flows, or implement controls
on both inflows and outflows, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Brazil.
Capital controls is regarded as part of prudential regulations and is used to restrict capital flows
from certain directions. The reason behind this restriction is from the the fear that one free capital
flows may magnify the contagion effects at the time of international crises. Therefore, it is the
hope that capital controls can restrict and/or restructure capital flows and prevent the economy
from crises. This might explain why capital controls have become one popular policy that many
countries have reconsidered or have implemented, especially the emerging economies.
While capital controls have become more popular, its effectiveness on affecting capital flows and
on preventing crises is still under debates. The earlier studies on capital flows are limited to the
data, which often has the net flows available, but not gross flows. The recent studies, although
overcoming the limitation on net flows and able to develop methods to analyze gross capital flows,
have its difficulties to conclude the effectiveness of capital controls. For example, Forbes and
Warnock (2012) find that capital controls have little association to foreign-driven capital flows.
El-Shagi (2011) discovers that capital controls can restructure capital flows without distorion.
One main reason why the effectiveness of capital controls in empirical studies remains inconclu-
sive is because of the different aspects on which each individual research focuses. Some focus on
certain periods to looks at waves of flows [Forbes and Warnock (2012)]; some focus on panel data of
certain countries [Ding and Jinjarak(2012), El-Shagi (2011)], and others focus on the aggregate flows
of one single country, such as Brazil, Malaysia...etc. Moreover, the definitions of capital accounts
and flows in different countries could be different. The results of capital flows in empirical studies
are sentsitive to the measurement and econometric methods adopted in the analysis. That is,
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depending on the measurement and econometric methods, the empirical studies on the same capital
controls in the same country may have opposite conclusions on the effectiveness of the controls.
These existing apple-to-orange problems related to capital controls in empirical studies might be
resolved by a unified theoretical framework, as Magud and Reinhart (2007) suggest. It is the goal
of this paper to construct a theoretical framework which incoporates the key factors of capital flows
to provide a mechanism through which capita controls affect international capital flows and may
(or may not) prevent/cause banking crises. The contribution of this paper provides the insights
of the debates on the effectiveness of capital controls by analyzing macroeconomic consequences of
controls and by offering explanations of why capital controls are effective in some research but not
in others.
According to current studies, successful capital controls must achieve the following outcome:
affecting the volume and the composition of capital flows, and preventing the economy from in-
ternational financial crises. These outcome will be the criteria of this paper to determine the
effectiveness of capital controls. Since most of sudden stops ar associated with banking crises,
rather than currency crises [references], it is banking crises the main focus of this paper. Regarding
to the framework, this paper developes an open-economy overlapping generations model with both
the debt and the equity markets. By incorporating the characteristics of both credit markets,
this paper analyzes the macroeconomic consequences of the economy without controls and of the
economies under different types of capital controls.
As a results, the challenges faced by the banks under different types of controls are different.
Whether banks would run depends on the domestic conditions as well as capital flows. It is shown
that symmetric controls are more effective in achieving all three outcomes: affecting both the
volume and the composition and preventing the economy from crises, compared to the economy
without controls. Symmetric controls means that both countries control on inflows, or that both
counrties control on outflows. Asymmetric controls, however, are not as effective to achieve the
outcomes. Whether asymmetric controls could achieve the outcoms depends on the interest rate
differentials, the controls of the other country, and the domestic conditions. If extending this
framework to multi-countries to look at gross flows to a certain country, it is possible to find that
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the flows from various countries may offset each other, and leave capital controls less relevant to
capital flows. This might be what has been showsn in Forbes and Warnock (2012). If focusing on
the countries to which the domestic country has asymmetric controls in similar way, it is possible
to find that interest rate differential and capital controls are linked to each other [El-Shagi (2011)].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the environment of the model
without capital controls, followed by the equilibrium in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the effects
of capital controls on inflows and outflows and whether the goals have been achieved. Conclusions
and possible conclusions are provided in Section 5.
2 The model without capital controls
This paper will start with an open economy with two countries and none has implement any form
of capital controls. Let us call these two countries the home country and the foreign country.
The population growth rate (n) of these two countries is assumed the same, Nt = nNt−1 and
N∗t = nN∗t−1, where Nt and N
∗
t represent the populations of the home and the foreign country at
period t, respectively. The economy of each country is composed of households, firms, and financial
intermediaries. The financial intermediaries serve as a middleman in both credit markets, the debt
and the equity markets, and as a portfolio manager for the depositors. As a portfolio manager,
the financial intermediaries could save duplication costs and share risks at some degree, so they
could offer a higher return rate, which cannot achieved by each individual [Champ, Freeman and
Haslag (2011), Bencivenga and Smith (1991)]. Therefore, individuals with rational expection would
deposit their income in the financial intermediaries rather than self-investing. Different from the
traditional setup, the financial intermediaries would act as firms maximizing profits, and are subject
to run, should they fail to meet demand deposit1.
1The conventional setup which often assume zero profit for the financial intermediaries has its difficulties in ad-
dressing the possibilities of bank runs. Therefore, this paper relaxes the zero-profit assumption for the financial
intermediaries.
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2.1 Households
Each individual is born identical and lives for three periods: young, middle-aged and old. The
endowment of each individual is one unit of labor when young and nothing when middle-aged and
when old. It is assumed that only the middle-aged (c2,t+1) and old (c3,t+2) consumption that
will be valued by each individual. Thus, the entire labour income will be deposited into the
financial intermediaries as soon as the income is earned when young. At every period, the financial
intermediaries have two types of short-term accounts available, one is saving accounts and the other
is investment accounts. Both types of accounts take one period to mature, and may offer different
return rates. That is mainly because saving accounts are for the debt market while the investment
accounts are for the equity market. More details will be provided in the later subsections.
At middle-aged, the individuals would grow to two different types: investors and entrepreneurs.
The type will be learned by each individual as soon as s/he turns middle-aged. The probability
of becoming to either type is exogenous. With a probability λ, an individual would become an
investor at middle-age, and with a probability (1− λ), an individual would become an entrepreneur.
The type of an individual remains unchanged through his lifetime and is private information to the
individual only. The distribution of types, however, is public information.
The investors and entrepreneurs are different mainly in two aspects: the skills and how they
spend the withdrawals of their short-term accounts. In terms of skills, the entrepreneurs own the
skills of obtaining funds in either credit market to finance projects, and the skills of operating firms
to produce output. Therefore, if operating firms is more profitable than doing other investment,
the entrepreneurs would spend his withdrawals on operating firms. The investors who do not have
these skills of entrepreneurs would spend the withdrawals on reinvestment. The utility function of
a young individual is assumed in the form of:
U(c2,t+1, c3,t+2) = −
(ci2,t+1 + σ
ici3,t+2)
−φ
φ
, (1)
where i = I (investor), E (entrepreneur), and σi represents the degree of patience regarding to how
ci3,t+2 is valued, relative to c
i
2,t+1. This degree of patience depends on the individual’s type. It is
assumed that 0 < σI < σE < 1. This indicates that investors (I) are less patient than entrepreneurs
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(E). After learning his own type, the middle-age household would visit the financial intermediaries
to withdraw his matured SR accounts and spend as his own type. When old, the entrepreneurs
would receive the profits from firm operation to consume, and the investors would receive returns
from their reinvestment for their consumption in old age.
The return rates of different types of accounts are assumed different. Both accounts take one
period to mature. The return rate of the saving accounts is the deposit rate
¡
1 + iDt
¢
, and the
return rate of the investment accounts is the equity rate
¡
1 + iEt+1
¢
. The only demand deposit is
saving accounts, to which the deposit rate,
¡
1 + iDt
¢
, is determined by the financial intermediaries
and is offered to the depositors at the time of deposit. The equity rate, (1 + iEt+1), however, is
determined by the equity market clearing condition and will be offered to the equity holders after
production is completed at the following period t+ 1.
As shown in Figure 3, a young individual would allocate between the two types of accounts:
a fraction αIt in the investment accoundt and the rest
¡
1− αIt
¢
in the saving accounts. At date
t+1, the young who deposited at period t and becomes middle-aged could withdraw their matured
accounts, and receives WMt+1:
WMt+1 ≡
¡
1 + iDt
¢ ¡
1− αIt
¢
wt +
¡
1 + iEt+1
¢
αItwt (2)
2.1.1 Investors
As shown in Figure 4, the middle-age individuals of generation t − 1 who learn their types would
behave as their own types at period t. That is, an investor would maximize his utility (cI2,t+σ
IcI3,t+1)
by choosing whether to re-invest (RI) and then which country to re-invest. Due to the transaction
costs, the investors would focus on one country to re-invest2 if there were no government restrictions,
such as capital controls. When the expected return rates are the same across countries, the investors
are assumed to re-invest in his domestic country. Moreover, given the constant transaction cost,
the return rate is higher by investing the entire amount in the same country.
2Providing fixed transaction costs, the rate of return is increasing in the investment amount. Therefore, the
investors are better off by investing in one country. This is especially true when the risks of investment across
countries are considered similar.
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Let αIMt,Dj denote the fraction of reinvestment placed in the investment accounts in country j
by a domestic investor, and let . A domestic investor, who decides to re-invest in the domestic
(foreign) country, would place a fraction, αIMt,DD
³
αIMt,DF
´
, of his/her total re-investment in investment
accounts and the rest, a fraction
³
1− αIMt,DD
´ ³
1− αIMt,DF
´
, in saving accounts. Let RIMt,DD denote
the expected rate of return of reinvestment by a domestic investor in the domestic country at period
t, RIMt,DD ≡
h¡
1 + iDt
¢ ³
1− αIMt,DD
´
+
¡
1 + iEt+1
¢
αIMt,DD
i
. Compared to the rate of storage, as long
as RIMt > 1, the investors would always reinvest. Then the old consumption of an investor would
become
cI3,t+1 =W
IM
t+1,DD = R
IM
t,D
¡
W IMt − cI2,t
¢
,
depending on the amount of reinvestment (RI) and the expected return rate of reinvestment.
2.2 Firms
The entrepreneurs are the only agents who have the special skills in operating firms. At period t,
a middle-aged entrepreneur of generation t− 1, after withdrawing his SR accounts, must transform
part of his WMt into capital goods (K) to start production. The transformation from output goods
to capital goods (K) is assumed to be one-to-one. The output production requires both capital
goods (Kt) and labour (Lt) as inputs, and takes one period to complete. The production is in
the Cobb-Douglas form with constant return to scale: Yt+1 = AtKθt L
1−θ
t , 0 < θ < 1, where At
represents production technology, and Yt+1 represents total output goods produced at period t+1.
Moreover, it takes exogenous sunk cost qt to operate a firm, and the wage income of all labours
has to be paid by the end of period t, which is before the completion of the production at period
t+1. Therefore, it requires the amount (qt+wtLt+Kt) to start the production at period t. The
assumption qt +wtLt +Kt > WMt implies that any entrepreneur who plans to operate a firm must
borrow to start production.
There are two resources available to the entrepreneurs to obtain funds. One resource is to
file applications to financial intermediaries to obtain loans (the debt market). The other is to
issue equities in the equity market. To simplify the model, it is assumed that entrepreneurs could
raise funds in their own domestic credit markets only3. Since the production takes one period to
3Because of the regulations, the entrepreneurs who are eligible to issue equity in their own dometic countries may
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complete, the entrepreneurs would acquire only short-term fund.
2.2.1 Debt finance
To acquire a loan from the financial intermediaries, an entrepreneur must to provide collateral
(Bt), which will not be returned until the loan is repaid. The amount of loan demanded by an
entrepreneur is:
bDt = qt + wtLt −
¡
WMt − cE2,t −Kt −Bt
¢
, (3)
where cE2,t represents the entrepreneur’s middle-aged consumption. In the debt market, the source
of loanable fund is limited to the sum of depositors’ saving accounts at that period. When loan
demand exceeds loan supply, the type 2 credit rationing will be the result4. That means that
only a fraction
¡
βD
¢
of entrepreneurs would obtain loans from the financial intermediaries. Let
St denote loanable funds which is the sum of all saving accounts at period t. Let RIDt denote
the sum of total re-investment, both saving and investment accounts, by the domestic investors,
RIDt ≡
£
λ+
¡
1− βD − βE
¢¤
N
¡
WMt − c2,t
¢
, and let RIFt denote the sum of total re-investment
by the foreign investors, RIFt ≡ (1/et)
£
λ∗ +
¡
1− βD∗ − βE∗
¢¤
N∗
¡
WM∗t − c∗2,t
¢
. Let γt (1− γ∗t )
denote the fraction of domestic (foreign) investors who re-invest in the domestic country. The
loanable fund can be written as
St ≡
¡
1− αIt
¢
wtN + γt
¡
1− αIMt,DD
¢
RIDt + (1− γ∗t )
¡
1− αIM∗t,FD
¢
RIFt ,
where the first term is the total saving of the young, the second and the third terms are the total
savings of the domestic and the foreign investors, respectively.As shown in Figure 5, the resource
constraint for the debt market is
St ≥ βDt (1− λ)NtbDt . (4)
not able to do so in the foreign countries. Also, this is to reflect the facts that the costs to acquire information
of foreign entrepreneurs before providing funds could be very high and that the entrepreneurs usually have more
difficulties raising funds in foreign countries.
4According to Blanchard and Fischer (1989, page 479), the type 2 credit rationing defined as follows: given an
interested rate, some borrowers get credit but others do not, and all borrowers are identical. In this model, it requires
the entreprenreneurs to obtain sufficient amount of fund to operate firms, so it will be type 2 credit rationing.
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The entrepreneurs who obtain loans are called debt-finance entrepreneurs, and would definitely
start the production. Similarly, the entrepreneurs who obtain funds in the equity market are called
equity-finance entrepreneurs.
The loan rate
¡
1 + iloant
¢
is determined by the financial intermediaries at the time when the
debt contract is constructed. The debt contract is designated that the debt payment must be
affordable,
¡
1 + iloant
¢
bDt < Yt+1 and incentive compatible for the entrepreneurs to be willing to
borrow funds to operate firms. Moreover, the debt contract would count for the uncertainty and
ensure that the entrepreneurs would always be truth-telling5. Let p denote the probability that the
production succeeds, the loan is repaid, and the entrepreneur earns his collateral back. Otherwise,
with probability (1− p), the production fails, the entrepreneur cannot repay the loan, and would
lose his collateral to the financial intermediaries.
The expected payoff of a debt-finance entrepreneur is his expected capital gains: EtΠDFt+1 =
p
£
Yt+1 −
¡
1 + iLoant
¢
bDt +Bt
¤
. The incentive constraint for an entrepreneur to obtain a loan to
operate his firm is:
cE2,t + σ
EEtΠ¯DFt+1 ≥ cI2,t + σEMax
©
W IMt+1,DD,W
IM
t+1,DF
ª
, (5)
whereW IMt+1,DD andW
IM
t+1,DF represent the expected returns to an investor who invest in the domestic
and the foreign country, respectively. This indicates that the entrepreneurs would start production
only if the expected capital gains are higher than the maximum expected returns of an investor. In
other words, if the expected capital gains were less than the returns of an investor, the entrepreneurs
would prefer to become an investor, rather than start production.
2.2.2 Equity finance
The entrepreneur who do not obtain loans could issue equities in the equity market. The funds
available to purchase equities is restricted to the sum of all investment accounts (It),
It ≡ αItwtN + γtαIMt RIDt + (1− γ∗t )αIM∗t,FDRIFt ,
5That is, verification would take place whenever the loan repayment is not made. The verification would take away
all entrepreneurs’ profits.
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where the first term is the sum of investment accounts of the young, and the second and the third
terms are the sum of the investment accounts of the domestic and te foreign investors, respectively.
Different from the debt market, the equity market does not require collateral (BEt = 0), so the
amount to borrow becomes bEt = qt + wtLt −
¡
WMt −Kt
¢
< bDt . The resource constraint for the
equity market is:
It ≥ bEt (1− λ)βENt. (6)
Equation (6) shows that the limited amount of fund to purchase equity indicates that only a fraction
βEof entrepreneurs who could obtain sufficient funds to operate firms, and βD + βE ≤ 1. The
entrepreneurs, who do not obtain funds via debt or equity finance, would become investors.
Another difference between the debt and the equity market is that the equity rate
¡
1 + iEt+1
¢
is determined by the equity market clearing condition at the period t + 1 when the production is
completed: ¡
1 + iEt+1
¢
=
p
¡
1 +EtiEt+1
¢
(1− λ)βENbEt
It
=
(1− λ)βENpψtY EFt+1
It
, (7)
where ψt represents the expected fraction of output which is extracted to repay the equity holders
by the equity-finance entrepreneurs who have successful production. The equity rate
¡
1 + iEt+1
¢
may not be the same as the deposit rate
¡
1 + iDt
¢
.
Similarly, the expected capital gain of an equity-finance entrepreneur isEtΠEFt+1 = p
£
Yt+1 −
¡
1 +EtiEt+1
¢
bEt
¤
.
The incentive constraint for an equity-finance entrepreneur to borrow to operate his firm is:
cE2,t + σ
EEtΠ¯EFt+1 ≥ cI2,t + σE
©
W IMt+1,DD,W
IM
t+1,DF
ª
. (8)
Equation (8) shows that before raising funds in the equity market to operate firms, the entrepreneurs
would form an expectation for the equity rate. Based on the expectationary equity rate, the equity-
finance entrepreneurs make the deicsions on the amount of capital goods to invest, and the amount
of labour to hire.
2.2.3 Equilibrium Capital Gains to the Entrepreneurs
When the expectationary equity rate equals the loan rate, EtiEt+1 = i
loan
t , the entrepreneurs, whether
debt- or equity-finance would invest the same amount of capital goods and hire the same amount of
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labour KDFt = KEFt , and LDFt = LEFt . The full employment assumption gives wDFt = wEFt , which
shows no wage discrimination and no labour mobility across firms. Thus, when EtiEt+1 = i
loan
t , the
equilibrium capital input (K¯DFt , K¯EFt ), labour demand (L¯DFt , L¯EFt ), and wage rate (w¯DFt , w¯EFt )
are:
K¯DFt = K¯
EF
t =
1
(1− λ)
¡
βD + βE
¢ µ Atθ
1 + iloant
¶1/(1−θ)
,
L¯DFt = L¯
EF
t =
1
(1− λ)
¡
βD + βE
¢ , (9)
w¯DFt = w¯
EF
t = θ
θ/(1−θ)(1− θ)
µ
At
1 + iloant
¶1/(1−θ)
.
The equilibrium values of the variables in equation (9) can be used to determine the equilibrium
capital gains to entrepreneurs:
EtΠ¯DFt+1 = p
£
Y¯t+1 −
¡
1 + iLoant
¢
b¯Dt +Bt
¤
, (10)
EtΠ¯EFt+1 = p
£
Y¯t+1 −
¡
1 +EtiEt+1
¢
b¯Et
¤
.
By plugged equation (10) into equations (5) and (8), one can derive both the maximum loan rate
and the equity rate which the entrepreneurs can accept:
¡
1 + iLoant
¢
≤
Y¯t+1 − 1p
n
W IMt+1,DD,W
IM
t+1,DF
o
+Bt
b¯Dt
≡ max
¡
1 + iLoant
¢
, (11)
¡
1 +EtiEt+1
¢
≤
Y¯t+1 − 1p
n
W IMt+1,DD,W
IM
t+1,DF
o
b¯Et
≡ max
¡
1 +EtiEt+1
¢
.
2.3 Financial Intermediaries
Different types of accounts have different purposes. The saving accounts are for the debt market
while the investment accounts are for the equity market. It is assumed that the financial interme-
diaries do not mix or misuse the funds of each type of accounts. Recall that saving accounts are
the only type of demand depsoits. Failing to repay demand deposits could result in bank runs.
Therefore, the financial intermediaries must choose carefully the deposit rate. Any deposit rate
must be sufficiently high to attract depositors and must be affordable for the financial intermediaries
to meet demand deposit. The problem faced by the domestic financial intermediaries at date t is
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to maximize the expected payoff EtΠBt+1 by choosing i
D
t and iloant :
EtΠBt+1 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
£
St+1 − βDt+1 (1− λ)NbDt+1
¤
+
£
(1− λ)βDt N
£
p
¡
1 + iloant
¢
bDt + (1− p)Bt
¤
−
¡
1 + iDt
¢
St
¤
⎫
⎬
⎭ , (12)
where the first bracket is to supply the new loans to the debt-finance entrepreneurs, and the second
bracket is to use the loan repayment to meet the matured demand deposits. The liquidity constraint
of the financial intermediaries at period t+ 1 is:h
p
³
1 + iloant
´
bDt + (1− p)Bt
i
(1− λ)βDt N ≥
¡
1 + iDt
¢
St, (13)
which is for the matured demand deposits, the saving accounts6. Note that the left hand side of
equation (13) is the assets while the right hand side is the liability for the financial intermediaries.
Therefore, when the right hand side is higher than the left hand side, the financial intermediaries
would have liquidity shortfalls and experience insolvency.
To attract the deposit from the young, the deposit rate must exceed the rate of return of storage,¡
1 + iDt
¢
>
³
1 + istoraget
´
= 1. Meanwhile, to attract the deposits from the investors, both domestic
and foreign, the deposit rate must be competitive, compared to the foreign deposit rate. Recall
that the investors would focus on one country to invest, the incentive constraints for the investors
to re-invest in the domestic country requires that the expected domestic return rate exceeds the
expected foreign return rate. Moreover, since the focus of this paper is not on the exchange rate,
it is assume that the exchange rate between the domestic and the foreign country is one in this
real economy. Therefore, the incentive constraints for the domestic investors [equation (14a)] and
for the foreign investors [equation (14b)] to re-invest in the domestic country can be written as
follows:
RIMt,DD ≥ RIM∗t,DF , (14a)
RIMt,FD > R
IM∗
t,FF , (14b)
6Since the returns of debt and equity are from successful production of the entrepreneurs, and the probability of a
successful production is identical for all entrepreneurs, the degree of risks for debt and equity the same. That means
that debt or equity is not riskier than the other, and the concept of capital requirement does not apply in this model.
This is mainly because capital requirement divides assets into different groups based on the degree of risk, and asks
the financial intermediaries to invest in less riskier assets. In this model, when all assets, debt the equity share the
same degree of risk, the capital requirement cannot be applied in this model.
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where RIMt,iD
³
RIM∗t,iF
´
represents the expected domestic (foreign) return rate to a country i’s investor:
RIMt,FD ≡
¡
1 + iDt
¢ ³
1− αIM∗t,FD
´
+
¡
1 +EtiEt+1
¢
αIM∗t,FD, R
IM∗
t,DF ≡
h¡
1 + iD∗t
¢ ³
1− αIMt,DF
´
+
¡
1 +EtiE∗t+1
¢
αIMt,DF
i
,
and RIM∗t,FF ≡
h¡
1 + iD∗t
¢ ³
1− αIM∗t,FF
´
+
¡
1 +EtiE∗t+1
¢
αIM∗t,FF
i
. Note that it is possible for αIMt,DF 6=
αIMt,DF and/or α
IM∗
t,FD 6= αIM∗t,FF , which means that the domestic and/or foreign investors have different
investment portfolios when re-investing in the domestic and foreign countries.
Provided the deposit rate which is determined by the financial intermediaries before taking the
deposits, and the loan rate which has its maximum, equation (13) indicates that where βDt = 1,
there is a maximum amount of deposit which the financial intermediaries can take:.
St ≤
£
pmax
¡
1 + iloant
¢
bDt + (1− p)Bt
¤
(1− λ)N¡
1 + iDt
¢ ≡ maxSt. (15)
The amount of deposit, which exceeds the maxium deposit may result in liquidity shortfalls in the
following period. Should the liquidity shortfalls not be resolved, bank runs will be the result.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Closed economy (CL)
In a closed economy (CL), there is no capital inflow or outflow, γt = 1, and γ∗t = 1. The only
source of deposits is from domestic agents. The amount of aggregate domestic saving is SCLt =¡
1− αIt
¢
wtN+
³
1− αIMt,DD
´
RIDt , and the amount of aggrement equity investment is ICLt = αItwtN+
αIMt,DDRI
D
t . Since the investors could invest in the their own countries only, the incentive constraints
to attract investors to invest in the domestic country do not apply. The equity rate offered to the
equity holders is restricted to the incentive constraint of the equity-finance entrepreneurs [equation
(11)]. The deposit rate offered to the depositors must be affordable. That is, the total repayment
to the depositors must be no more than the total loan repayment by the entrepreneurs.
³
1 + iD(k)t
´
≤
h
pmax
³
1 + iloan(k)t
´
bDt + (1− p)Bt
i
(1− λ)βDt N
Skt
, (16)
where the superscript k represents the case. In this closed economy, k = CL. In this closed
economy, the amount of deposits to receive can be easily predicted: St = SCLt when
³
1 + iD(CL)t
´
>
1, and St = 0 when
³
1 + iD(CL)t
´
≤ 1. Therefore, When there is no adverse shock which affects the
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liquidity constraint, for the deposit rate that satisfies equation (16), it is less likely to have bank
runs.
3.1.1 Banking crises
Similar to Chang (2012), this paper introduces a large adverse shock (εt) on the successful rate of
projects (p) at period t to examine whether banking crises can be prevented in the closed economy
and in an open economy with and without capital controls. This adverse shock is assumed suffi-
ciently large to cause liquidity shortfalls and may lead to immediate bank runs at period t if the
shortfalls were not overcome. Based on equation (13), this liquidity shortfalls at period t caused
by the adverse shock in this closed economy is:
SF kt ≡
³
1 + iD(k)t−1
´
Skt−1−
h
(p− εt)
³
1 + iloan(k)t−1
´
bDt−1 + (1− p+ εt)Bt−1
i
(1− λ)βDt−1N > 0, k = CL.
(17)
One source which is often used by the financial intermediaries to finance the shortfalls is the new
deposits, which are from the young and from the investors. While the young would deposit when
the deposit rate is greater than one, the investors would not deposit until receiving the repayments
of their matured accounts. This implies that the deposits from the young is the only recource which
the financial intermediaries could use to finance the liquidity shortfalls.
Let SCLt,y denote the deposit of the young in the saving accounts, SCLt,y =
¡
1− αIt
¢
wtN . If
SCLt,y < SFCLt , there are investors not receiving repayments of their mature accounts. Without
meeting demand deposits, the financial intermediaries will run immediately. Therefore, it requires
SCLt,y ≥ SFCLt to meet demand deposits and to prevent the immediate bank runs at period t.
After overcoming the liquidity shortfalls and repaying the matured accounts, the financial inter-
mediaries could now attract the investors to deposit. In the closed economy, the investors would
re-invest when the deposit rate is greater than one, which is the same condition to attract the
deposits from the young. So the total deposits would be SCLt , and the loanable funds to the entre-
preneurs would reduced to
¡
SCLt − SFCLt
¢
, which would lower the likelihood for the entrepreneurs
to obtain the loan βDt (1− λ)Nt =
¡
SCLt − SFCLt
¢
/bDt [equation(4)]. Consequently, even if the
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adverse shock is temporary, the liquidity shortfalls may still exist at period t+ 1:
SF kt+1 ≡
³
1 + iD(k)t
´
Skt −
h
p
³
1 + iloan(k)t
´
bDt + (1− p)Bt
i ¡
Skt − SF kt
¢
bDt
, k = CL. (18)
If not able to overcome the shortfalls SFCLt+1 indicated in equation (18), the financial intermediaries
would experience bank runs at the following period t+ 1. One example is when the deposits from
the young equals the shortfalls at period t, SCLt,y = SFCLt , the loanable fund would be the deposits
from the investors,
¡
SCLt − SFCLt
¢
=
¡
1− αIMt
¢
RIDt . The fact that
¡
1 + iDt
¢
> 1 implies that in
order for to overcome the liquidity shortfalls, SFCLt+1 = 0, the loan rate must be sufficiently high and
satisfy the following condition:³
1 + iloan(k)t
´
≥ 1
p
"Ã
Skt,y
Skt − SF kt
+ 1
!
− (1− p)Bt
bDt
#
= min
³
1 + iloan(k)t
´
, k = CL (19)
However, the loan rate has its maximum value max
¡
1 + iLoant
¢
[equation (11)]. Any loan rate
charged by the intermediariers exceeds the maximum value
³
1 + iloan(CL)t
´
> max
¡
1 + iLoant
¢
would
result in no entrepreneur apply for loans. Thus, the liquidity shortfalls would become
SFCLt+1 ≡
¡
1 + iDt
¢
SCLt −
¡
SCLt − SFCLt
¢
(20)
= iDt S
CL
t + SF
CL
t > SF
CL
t ,
which is greater than SFCLt , and more difficult for the financial intermediaries to overcome. There-
fore, it is more likely to have bank runs at period t+ 1.
3.2 An open economy without capital controls (NC, original framework)
In an open economy without controls, the country in which the investors would re-invest depends
on the relative expected return rate. The mobiliy of investors’ re-investment is a challenge to
the financial intermediaries in tedecide the deposit rate to offer. On one hand, the deposit rate
must be sufficienyly high in order to attract the investors. However, a higher deposit rate at
date t which attract more deposits means a higher debt (demand deposit) to be repaid at period
t + 1. On the other hand, a low deposit rate which attracts less deposits means less loanable
fund. The lower amount of loanable fund would drive up the loan rate in order to repay the
demand deposits. However, the loan rate has its maximum value [equation (11)], and any loan rate
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exceeding max
¡
1 + iloant
¢
would result in no entreprenurs borrowing. Without loan repayment at
the following period t+ 1, the financial intermediaries cannot overcome the liquidity shortfalls and
must run at period t+ 1.
Recall that the investors would re-invest in the country where they were born when the expected
return rate is the same across countries. This implies that it requires the expected foreign return rate
higher than the expected domestic return rate in order for the domestic investors to feel indifferent
in re-investing in either country, RIM∗t,DF = R
IM
t,DD + ξ
D
t where ξ
D
t represents the risk premium for
the domestic investors to invest in the foreign country, and vice versa, RIMt,FD = R
IM∗
t,FF + ξ
F
t , where
ξFt is similar to the risk premium for the foreign investors to invest in the domestic country. For
simplicity, it is assumed that when RIM∗t,DF = R
IM
t,DD + ξ
D
t holds for all αIMt,Dj ∈ [0, 1], j = D,F , it
is true that RIM∗t,FF > R
IM
t,FD. Meanwhile, when R
IM
t,FD = R
IM∗
t,FF + ξ
F
t holds for all αIM∗t,F j ∈ [0, 1],
j = D,F , it is true that RIMt,DD > R
IM∗
t,DF .
Let γNCt
¡
γNC∗t
¢
where γNCt , γNC∗t ∈ (0, 1) denote the fraction of the domestic (foreign) investors
who re-invest in the domestic (foreign) country when feeling indifferent in re-investing in either
country. Under the circumstance where RIM∗t,DF = R
IM
t,DD + ξ
D
t , ∀αIMt,Dj ∈ [0, 1], j = D,F , all foreign
investors and a fraction
¡
1− γNCt
¢
of domestic investors would reinvest in the foreign country.
When the expected foreign return rate is relatively attractive, the capital outflows (COt,F ) from
and inflows (CIt,F ) to the domesitc country are:
CONCt,F =
¡
1− γNCt
¢
RIDt , CI
NC
t,F = 0,
respectively. Accordingly, the sum of saving accounts is SNCt,F =
¡
1− αIt
¢
wtN+γNCt
³
1− αIMt,DD
´
RIDt
and the amount of equity fund is INCt,F = α
I
twtN + γNCt αIMt,DDRI
D
t . When RIMt,DF > R
IM∗
t,DD + ξ
D
t ,
both domestic and foreign investors would invest in the foreign country, γNCt = 0, and capital
outflows would become CONCt,F = RI
D
t while inflows remains the same, CINCt,F = 0. Therefore,
the loanable and equity funds would be purely from the young: SNCt =
¡
1− αIt
¢
wtN = SNCt,y , and
INCt = αItwtN .
Under the circumstance where RIMt,FD = R
IM∗
t,FF + ξ
F
t , all domestic investors and a fraction¡
1− γNC∗t
¢
of foreign investors would invest in the domestic country. The volumes of capital
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flows of the domestic country are:
CONCt,D = 0, CI
NC
t,D =
¡
1− γNC∗t
¢
RIFt .
Accordingly, the amounts of loanable and equity funds are: SNCt,D =
¡
1− αIt
¢
wtN+
³
1− αIMt,DD
´
RIDt +³
1− αIM∗t,FD
´ ¡
1− γNC∗t
¢
RIFt , INCt,D = α
I
twtN + αIMt,DDRI
D
t + αIM∗t,FD
¡
1− γNC∗t
¢
RIFt . As shown in
equation (15), provided the deposit rate
³
1 + iD(NC)t
´
, and βDt = 1, the amount of saving which is
affordable by the financial intermediaries must satisfy the following condition:
Skt ≤
£
pmax
¡
1 + iloant
¢
bDt + (1− p)Bt
¤
(1− λ)N³
1 + iD(k)t
´ ≡ maxSkt , k = NC. (21)
In equation (21), maxSkt represents the maximum amount of the savings which is affordable by
the financial intermediaries. The value of maxSkt is decreasing in the deposit rate,
³
1 + iD(k)t
´
.
Any amount of saving exceeds this threshold
³
SNCt,D > maxS
NC
t
´
would result in insolvency at the
following period since the reveived loan repayment is insufficient to repay the demand deposits. If
such insolvency cannot be overcome, bank runs will be the result at the following period t + 1.
This means that even without an adverse shock, the insolvency is possible when the financial
intermediaries take the amount of deposits which exceeds the threshold. Moreover, when RIMt,FD >
RIM∗t,FF + ξ
F
t , all domestic and foreign investors would re-invest in the domestic country, γNC∗t = 1,
and capital inflows would increase to CINCt,D = RI
F
t . Therefore, it is important for the financial
intermediaries to accept the amount of savings S¯NCt,D ≤ maxSNCt to prevent insolvency.
If SNCt,D > maxS
NC
t , and the financial intermediaries accept savings S¯NCt,D ≤ maxSNCt , the
amount
³
SNCt,D − S¯NCt,D
´
would move to the equity market, and increase the amount of equity fund,
INCt,D = α
I
twtN + αIMt,DDRI
D
t + αIM∗t,FD
¡
1− γNC∗t
¢
RIFt +
³
SNCt,D − S¯NCt,
´
. This increase in the equity
fund would cause the equity rate at the following period
³
1 + iE(NC)t+1,D
´
to decrease.
3.2.1 Banking crises and capital flows
At the time of adverse shock (εt), the financial intermediaries face the liquidity shortfalls as shown in
equation (17) with k = NC. To attract the deposits from the young
¡
SNCt,y
¢
to finance the shortfalls,
the deposit rate must be greater than one,
³
1 + iD(NC)t
´
> 1. Then it requires SNCt,y ≥ SFNCt to
prevent immediate bank runs at period t. However, using the new deposit to finance SFNCt might
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lead to the liquidity shortfalls at period t+1, SFNCt+1 [equation (18) with k = NC]. If SF
NC
t+1 cannot
be overcome, bank would run at period t + 1. Whether SFNCt+1 can be overcome depends on the
relative values of expected return rates and the loan rate and deposit rate.
Under the circumstance whereRIM∗t,DF = R
IM
t,DD + ξ
D
t , and SNCt,y = SFNCt , the loanable fund after
financing SFNCt is ¡
SNCt,F − SFt
¢
= γNCt
¡
1− αIMt,DD
¢
RIDt ,
which is less than that in the closed economy,
³
SNCt,F − SFt
´
<
³
SCLt,F − SFt
´
because γNCt <
1. Substituting the value of
³
SNCt,F − SFt
´
into equation (19) gives the minumum loan rate,
min
³
1 + iloan(NC)t,F
´
, which financial intermediaries must charge in order to meet the demand de-
posit. Moreover, one can find that min
³
1 + iloan(NC)t,F
´
> min
³
1 + iloan(CL)t,F
´
. Compared to equa-
tion (11), when min
³
1 + iloan(NC)t,F
´
> max
¡
1 + iloant
¢
> min
³
1 + iloan(CL)t,F
´
, the open economy
without capital controls (NC) is worse than a closed economy in overcomeing the liquidity shortfalls
SF kt+1 and in preventing bank runs at period t+ 1.
Moreover, when RIM∗t,DF > R
IM
t,DD + ξ
D
t , all domestic investors re-invest in the foreign coun-
try, γNCt = 0, like the foreign investors. So when SNCt,y = SFNCt , the loanable fund becomes³
SNCt,F − SFNCt
´
= 0 after financing the liquidity shortfalls, SFNCt . This would lead to
³
1 + iloan(NC)t,F
´
→
∞ [equation (19) with k = NC], which means that the liquidity shortfalls can not be overcome,
and that bank runs at period t+ 1.
Under the circumstance where RIMt,FD = R
IM∗
t,FF + ξ
F
t and SNCt,y = SFNCt , the loanable fund
becomes ¡
SNCt,D − SFNCt
¢
=
¡
1− αIMt,DD
¢
RIDt +
¡
1− γNC∗t
¢ ¡
1− αIM∗t,FD
¢
RIFt ,
which is more than that in the closed economy,
³
SNCt,D − SFt
´
>
³
SCLt,D − SFt
´
. As the amount of
deposits is high, and part of it is used to finance the liquidity shortfalls, it is important to ensure
that equation (21) with k = NC is satisfied. This is especially true when RIMt,FD > R
IM∗
t,FF + ξ
F
t ,
and γNC∗t = 0. Compared to case CL, since
³
1 + iD(NC)t,D
´
>
³
1 + iD∗(NC)t,D
´
> 1, the domestic
deposit rate could also be higher than that in case CL,
³
1 + iD(NC)t,D
´
>
³
1 + iD(CL)t,D
´
. This would
lead to maxSNCt,D < maxS
CL
D . Should the financial intermediaries accept the amount of savings
which exceeds the threshold, SNCt,D > maxS
NC
t,D , bank runs at period t+1. In this aspect, the open
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economy without capital controls would do worse than a closed economy in overcoming SFNCt+1 and
in preventing bank runs at period t+ 1.
3.3 An open economy with capital controls
The controls on capital flows are assumed to set up a ceiling to which each investor could invest in
a particular country. For example, the controls on capital inflows are to set up a ceiling to which
a foreign investor could invest in the domestic country, and the controls on capital outflows are to
set up a ceiling to which a domestic investor could invest in the foreign country. Therefore, capital
flows may be affected by capital controls of both countries or either country.
Since symmetric and asymmetric controls have different impacts on the volumes and the com-
positions of flows as well as the ability in preventing banking crises. This section would discuss
symmetric and asymmetric controls separately. To be more specific, the symmetric controls are the
case where both countries have controls on the same type of flows, regardless of the size of controls.
All other cases are asymmetric controls.
The assumption that both countries are symmetric allows this paper to focus on the impacts on
the domestic country only. The analysis for the foreign country can be easily applied by adding
asterisk to each variable. The cases of symmetric controls are symmtric controls on outflows
(SCCO), and on inflows (SCCI). The cases of asymmetric controls are: domestic controls on
outflows vs. no foreign controls (ACON), domestic controls on outflows vs. foreign controls on
inflows (ACOI), and domestic controls on inflows vs. no foreign controls (ACIN).
It is assumed that the controls are imposed at perod t. This means that the values of all
variables determined prior to period t would be the same in all cases. For example, St−1 =
SNCt−1 = S
k
t−1, and
¡
1 + iDt−1
¢
=
³
1 + iD(NC)t−1
´
=
³
1 + iD(k)t−1
´
,where k represents any open economy
case. According to equation (17), since all componenct of SFt are the variebles detemined priot
to period t, the values of SFt is the same in all open economy cases, SFt = SFNCt = SF kt ,
k = SCCO,SCCI,ACON,ACOI,ACIN.
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3.3.1 Symmetric capital controls
Both countries control capital outflows (SCCO) In this case, the domestic country sets up
the ceiling, γˆSCCOt > γNCt ,for each domestic investor while for foreign country sets up the ceiling,
γ˜SCCO∗t > γNC∗t for each foreign investor. Under the circumstance where RIM∗t,DF ≥ RIMt,DD + ξDt ,
a fraction
¡
1− γˆSCCOt
¢
of domestic investors and all foreign investors would invest in the foreign
country. The volumes of capital flows of the domestic country are:
COSCCOt,F =
¡
1− γˆSCCOt
¢
RIDt , CI
CCO
t,F = 0,
which the volume of capital outflows is less than that in case NC, COSCCOt,F < CO
NC
t,F . The amount
of loanable fund (saving accounts) is SSCCOt,F =
¡
1− αIt
¢
wtN + γˆSCCOt
³
1− αIMt,DD
´
RIDt , and the
amount of equity fund (investment accounts) is ISCCOt,F = α
I
twtN + γˆ
SCCO
t αIMt,DDRI
D
t . Both funds
are more than the case NC, SSCCOt,F > S
NC
t,F , and I
SCCO
t,F > I
NC
t,F . Since the deposit rate is pre-
determined, the change on the funds would affect the equity rate only. According to equation (7),
this increase in equity fund lowers the equity rate at period t+1,
³
1 + iE(SCCO)t+1,F
´
, which pays after
production is completed. This decrease in equity rate
³
1 + iE(SCCO)t+1
´
may shift the composition
of the deposits towards to the loanable fund by decreasing αIMt+1,DD and/or α
I
t+1.
Under the circumstance where RIMt,FD ≥ RIM∗t,FF + ξFt , all domestic investors and a fraction¡
1− γ˜SCCO∗t
¢
of foreign investors would re-invest in the domestic country. So capital outflows
and inflows would be:
COSCCOt,D = 0, CI
SCCO
t,D =
¡
1− γ˜SCCO∗t
¢
RIFt ,
where the capital inflows is less than the case without capital controls (NC), CISCCOt,D < CI
NC
t,D . Ac-
cordingly, the amount of loanable fund would become SSCCOt,D =
¡
1− αIt
¢
wtN+
³
1− αIMt,DD
´
RIDt +¡
1− γ˜SCCO∗t
¢ ³
1− αIM∗t,FD
´
RIFt , and the amount of equity fund would become ICCOt,D = α
I
twtN +
αIMt,DDRI
D
t +
¡
1− γ˜SCCO∗t
¢
αIM∗t,FDRI
F
t . Both funds are less than those in case NC, SSCCOt,D < S
NC
t,F ,
and ISCCOt, > INCt,F . The lower amount of equity fund would drive up the equity rate
³
1 + iE(SCCO)t+1,D
´
,
and may shift the composition of deposits towards the equity fund by increasing the values of αIM∗t,FD,
αIMt,DD and α
I
t may increase. The size of the changes on the composition is increasing in the gap
between γ˜SCCO∗t and γNC∗t . The further γ˜
SCCO∗
t deviates from γNC∗t , the larger sizes of the changes
on the compositions.
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Banking Crises At the time of the adverse shock (εt), the financial intermediaries face the
liquidity shortfalls SFt. By offering
³
1 + iD(SCCO)t
´
> 1, the financial intermediaries could attract
the deposit from the young, SSCCOt,y , which can be used to finance SFt. When SSCCOt,y ≥ SFt, the
immediate bank runs can be prevented. However, doing so is might lead to liquidity shortfalls at
following period t + 1, SFSCCOt+1 as shown in equation (18) with k = SCCO. Whether SF
SCCO
t+1
can be overcome would depend on the the expected return rates, the loan rate, and the amount of
deposits accepted by the financial intermediaries.
When RIM∗t,DF ≥ RIMt,DD + ξDt and SSCCOt,y = SFt, the available loanable fund after paying SFt
becomes
SSCCOt,F − SFt =
¡
1− αIMt
¢
γˆSCCOt RI
D
t ,
which is more than the fund in case NC,
³
SSCCOt,F − SFt
´
>
³
SNCt,F − SFt
´
because of γˆSCCOt >
γNCt . Substituting the values of SSCCOt,F and S
NC
t,F into equation (19) gives min
³
1 + iloan(SCCO)t,F
´
<
min
³
1 + iloan(NC)t,F
´
, which can be compared to the value of max
¡
1 + iloant
¢
in equation (11). When
min
³
1 + iloan(SCCO)t
´
< max
¡
1 + iloant
¢
< min
³
1 + iloan(NC)t
´
, the symmetric capital controls on
outflows could overcome SFSCCOt+1 , which cannot be achieved in the case without capital controls.
Moreover, the capital outflows are restricted by the domestic country which has a lower expect
return rate.
When RIMt,FD ≥ RIM∗t,FF + ξFt , ∀ αIM∗t,F j ∈ [0, 1], j = D,F , and SSCCOt,y = SFt, the available loanable
fund after paying SFt is
SSCCOt,D − SFt =
¡
1− αIMt,DD
¢
RIDt +
¡
1− γ˜SCCO∗t
¢ ¡
1− αIM∗t,FD
¢
RIFt ,
which is less than the fund without capital controls,
³
SSCCOt,D − SFt
´
<
³
SNCt,D − SFSCCOt
´
because
of γ˜SCCO∗t > γNC∗t . Since the deposit rate is relatively attractive and the amount of demand
deposit is relatively high, it is important that SSCCOt,D must satisfy equation (21) with k = SCCO.
In the case when
³
1 + iD(NC)t
´
=
³
1 + iD(SCCO)t
´
, and SSCCOt,D < maxS
SCCO
t = maxSNCt < SNCt,D ,
capital controls could overcome the liquidity shortfalls and prevent banking crises which cannot be
achieved in the case without capital controls.
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Both countries control capital inflows (SCCI) In this case, the domestic country sets up
the ceiling
¡
1− γˆSCCI∗t
¢
<
¡
1− γNC∗t
¢
for each foreign investor while the foreign country sets up
the ceiling
¡
1− γ˜SCCIt
¢
<
¡
1− γNCt
¢
for each domestic investor. Under the circumstance where
RIM∗t,DF ≥ RIMt,DD + ξDt , all foreign investors would re-invest in the foreign country but only a fraction¡
1− γ˜SCCIt
¢
of domestic investors would re-invest in the foreign country. The volumes of capital
flows of the domestic country would become:
COSCCIt,F =
¡
1− γ˜SCCIt
¢
RIDt , CI
CCI
t,F = 0,
where the volume of capital outflows is also less than the case NC, COSCCIt,F < CO
NC
t,F because
of
¡
1− γ˜SCCIt
¢
<
¡
1− γNCt
¢
. Note that the volume of capital outflows is restricted by the
foreign controls. The available loanable fund and equity fund are SSCCIt,F =
¡
1− αIt
¢
wtN +
γ˜SCCIt
³
1− αIMt,DD
´
RIDt and ISCCIt,F = α
I
twtN + γ˜
SCCI
t αIMt,DDRI
D
t . Both funds are more than the
case NC, SSCCIt,F > S
NC
t,F and I
SCCI
t,F > I
NC
t,F . The increase in equity fund would decrease the equity
rate
³
1 + iE(SCCI)t+1
´
, and decrease the values of αIMt+1,DD and α
I
t+1. This means that the composition
of deposit would shift away from the equity market.
Under the circumstance where RIMt,FD ≥ RIM∗t,FF + ξFt , all domestic investors and a fraction¡
1− γˆSCCO∗t
¢
of foreign investors would re-invest in the domestic country. Thevolumes of cap-
ital flows of the domestic country are:
COSCCIt,D = 0, CI
SCCI
t,D =
¡
1− γˆSCCI∗t
¢
RIFt ,
where the volume of capital inflows is less than the case NC, CISCCIt,D < CI
NC
t,D because of
¡
1− γˆSCCI∗t
¢
<¡
1− γNC∗t
¢
. The amounts of loanable fund and equity fund become SSCCIt,D =
¡
1− αIt
¢
wtN +³
1− αIMt,DD
´
RIDt +
¡
1− γˆSCCI∗t
¢ ³
1− αIM∗t,FD
´
RIFt , and ICCIt,D = α
I
twtN+αIMt,DDRI
D
t +
¡
1− γˆSCCI∗t
¢
αIM∗t,FDRI
F
t .
Both funds are less than the funds in the case NC, SSCCIt,D < S
NC
t,D and I
CCI
t,D < I
NC
t,D . This decrease
in the equity fund would drive up the equity rate
³
1 + iE(SCCO)t+1,D
´
, and increase the values of αIM∗t,FD,
αIMt,DD and α
I
t . This means that the compositions of the deposits, including capital inflows, would
shift towards the equity market. The sizes of the changes on the compositions are increasing in the
gap between γˆSCCO∗t and γNC∗t .
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Banking Crises At the time of the adverse shock (εt), the financial intermediaries face the liq-
uidity shortfalls SFt. By offering the deposit rate,
³
1 + iD(SCCI)t
´
> 1, the financial intermediaries
attract the deposits of the young, SSCCIt,y , which can be used to finance SFt. When SSCCIt,y ≥ SFt,
the liquidity shortfalls SFt are overcome and the immediate bank runs are prevented. However,
doing so might lead to liquidity shortfalls at following period t+ 1, SFSCCIt+1 , as shown in equation
(18) with k = SCCI. Whether the shortfalls can be overcome would depend on the the expected
return rates, the amount of demand deposits, and the loan rate.
When RIM∗t,DF ≥ RIMt,DD + ξDt and SSCCIt,y = SFt, the available loanable fund after paying SFt
becomes
SSCCIt,F − SFt =
¡
1− αIMt
¢
γ˜SCCIt RI
D
t ,
which is more than the fund in case NC,
³
SSCCIt,F − SFt
´
>
³
SNCt,F − SFt
´
because of γ˜SCCIt > γNCt .
Substituting the values of Skt,F , k = SCCI,NC into equation (19), one can obtainmin
³
1 + iloan(SCCI)t,F
´
<
min
³
1 + iloan(NC)t,F
´
. Compared to the value ofmax
¡
1 + iloant
¢
in equation (11), whenmin
³
1 + iloan(SCCI)t,F
´
<
max
¡
1 + iloant
¢
< min
³
1 + iloan(NC)t,F
´
, the symmetric capital controls again could overcome the liq-
uidity shortfalls, which cannot be achieved in case NC.
When RIMt,FD ≥ RIM∗t,FF +ξFt and SSCCIt,y = SFt, the available loanable fund after paying SFt would
change to
SSCCIt,D − SFt =
¡
1− αIMt,DD
¢
RIDt +
¡
1− γˆSCCI∗t
¢ ¡
1− αIM∗t,FD
¢
RIFt ,
which is less than the fund in case NC,
³
SSCCIt,D − SFt
´
<
³
SNCt,D − SFSCCOt
´
because of
¡
1− γˆSCCI∗t
¢
<¡
1− γNC∗t
¢
. According to equation (21) with k = SCCI, when
³
1 + iD(NC)t,D
´
=
³
1 + iD(SCCI)t,D
´
,
and SSCCIt,D < maxS
SCCI
t = maxSNCt < SNCt,D , this symmetric capital controls could overcome the
liquidity shortfalls and prevent banking crises which cannot be achieved in case NC.
3.3.2 Asymmetric capital controls
Domestic controls on outflows vs. no foreign controls (ACON) In this case, the domestic
country sets up the ceiling
¡
1− γˆACONt
¢
<
¡
1− γNCt
¢
for each domestic investor while no foreign
control. Under the circumstance where RIM∗t,DF ≥ RIMt,DD + ξDt , all foreign investors would re-invest
in the foreign country, but only a fraction
¡
1− γˆACONt
¢
of domestic investors would re-invest in the
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foreign country. The volumes of capital flows of the domestic country are:
COACONt,F =
¡
1− γˆACONt
¢
RIDt , CI
ACON
t,F = 0,
where the volume of capital outflows is less than the case NC, COACONt,F < CO
NC
t,F since
¡
1− γˆACONt
¢
<¡
1− γNCt
¢
. The restriction on the volume of capital outlflows is from the domestic controls. The
available loanable fund and equity fund are SACONt,F =
¡
1− αIt
¢
wtN+ γˆACONt
³
1− αIMt,DD
´
RIDt and
ISCCIt,F = α
I
twtN + γˆ
ACON
t αIMt,DDRI
D
t . These funds are more than the case NC, SACONt,F > S
NC
t,F
and IACONt,F > I
NC
t,F . The increase in the amount of equity fund would decrease the equity rate³
1 + iE(ACON)t+1
´
, and decrease the values of αIMt+1,DD and/or α
I
t+1. This means that the composi-
tion of deposit would shift away from the equity fund.
Under the circumstance where RIMt,FD = R
IM∗
t,FF + ξ
F
t , all domestic investors and a fraction¡
1− γACON∗t
¢
of foreign investors would re-invest in the domestic country. The volumes of capital
flows of the domestic country are:
COACONt,D = 0, CI
ACON
t,D =
¡
1− γACON∗t
¢
RIFt ,
where the volume of capital inflows is the same as the case NC, CIACONt,D = CI
NC
t,D since
¡
1− γACON∗t
¢
=¡
1− γNC∗t
¢
. The amount of loanable fund and equity fund are the same as the case NC, SACONt,D =
SNCt,D =
¡
1− αIt
¢
wtN +
³
1− αIMt,DD
´
RIDt +
¡
1− γACON∗t
¢ ³
1− αIM∗t,FD
´
RIFt , and IACONt,D = I
NC
t,D =
αItwtN + αIMt,DDRI
D
t +
¡
1− γACON∗t
¢
αIM∗t,FDRI
F
t . Therefore, the equity rate
³
1 + iE(SCCO)t+1,D
´
would
remain the same as before imposing capital controls, and so do the values of αIM∗t,FD, α
IM
t,DD and
αIt . This means that there is no change on the composition of the deposits. Note that when
RIMt,FD > R
IM∗
t,FF + ξ
F
t , all foreign investors would re-invest in the domestic country, γACON∗t = 0, and
the volume of capital inflows would change to CIACONt,D = RI
F
t . This is also the same as the case
without controls.
Banking Crises At the time of the adverse shock (εt), the financial intermediaries face the
liquidity shortfalls SFt . By offering the deposit rate
³
1 + iD(SCCI)t
´
> 1, the financial intermedi-
aries attract the deposits from the young SACONt,y . When SACONt,y ≥ SFt, the financial intermediaries
overcome SFt and prevent the immediate bank runs. However, whether the liquidity shortfalls at
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the following period t + 1 can be overcome would depend on the the expected return rates, the
amount of demand deposits, and the loan rate.
When RIM∗t,DF ≥ RIMt,DD + ξDt , and SACONt,y = SFt, the available loanable fund after paying SFt
becomes
SACONt,F − SFt =
¡
1− αIMt
¢
γˆACONt RI
D
t ,
where
³
SACONt,F − SFt
´
>
³
SNCt,F − SFt
´
. According to equation (19), min
³
1 + iloan(ACON)t
´
<
min
³
1 + iloan(NC)t
´
. Compared to equation (11), when min
³
1 + iloan(ACON)t
´
< max
¡
1 + iloant
¢
<
min
³
1 + iloan(NC)t
´
, this asymmetric capital controls, ACON, could overcome the liquidity short-
falls, SFACONt+1 , which cannot be achieved in NC.
When RIMt,FD = R
IM∗
t,FF + ξ
F
t and SACONt,y = SFt, the available loanable fund after paying SFt
would change to
SACONt,D − SFt =
¡
1− αIMt,DD
¢
RIDt +
¡
1− γACON∗t
¢ ¡
1− αIM∗t,FD
¢
RIFt ,
where
³
SACONt,D − SFt
´
=
³
SNCt,D − SFt
´
since γACON∗t = γNC∗t and SACONt,D = S
NC
t,D . Moreover,
when RIMt,FD > R
IM∗
t,FF + ξ
F
t , γACON∗t = γNC∗t = 0, and SACONt,D = S
NC
t,D . According to equation
(21) with k = ACON , when
³
1 + iD(NC)t
´
=
³
1 + iD(ACON)t
´
, SACONt,D = S
NC
t,D < maxS
ACON
t =
maxSNCt , the ability of capital control in overcoming the liquidity shortfalls and in preventing
banking crises is the same as the case NC.
Domestic controls on outflows vs. foreign controls on inflows (ACOI) In this case,
the controls are all for the domestic investors. While the domestic country sets up the ceiling¡
1− γˆACOIt
¢
<
¡
1− γNCt
¢
, the foreign country sets up the ceiling
¡
1− γ˜ACOIt
¢
<
¡
1− γNCt
¢
for
each domestic investor. When
¡
1− γˆACOIt
¢
<
¡
1− γ˜ACOIt
¢
, the domestic controls are more re-
strictive for the domestic investors to invest in the foreign country. Under the circumstance where
RIM∗t,DF ≥ RIMt,DD + ξDt , all foreign investors would re-invest in the foreign country but only a fraction¡
1− γˆACOIt
¢
of domestic investors would re-invest in the foreign country. The volumes of capital
flows of the domestic country are:
COACOIt,F =
¡
1− γˆACOIt
¢
RIDt , CI
ACOI
t,F = 0,
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where the voume of capital outflows is less than the case NC, COACOIt,F < CO
NC
t,F since
¡
1− γˆACOIt
¢
<¡
1− γNCt
¢
7. The available loanable and equity funds are SACOIt,F =
¡
1− αIt
¢
wtN+γˆACOIt
³
1− αIMt,DD
´
RIDt
and IACOIt,F = α
I
twtN + γˆ
ACOI
t αIMt,DDRI
D
t , which are more than the case NC, SACOIt,F > S
NC
t,F and
IACOIt,F > I
NC
t,F . Therefore, both the equity rate
³
1 + iE(ACOI)t+1
´
, and the values of αIMt+1,DD and/or
αIt+1 would decrease. This means that the composition of deposit would shift away from the equity
fund.
Under the circumstance where RIMt,FD = R
IM∗
t,FF + ξ
F
t , all domestic investors and a fraction¡
1− γACOI∗t
¢
of foreign investors would re-invest in the domestic country. So the volumes of
the capital flows of the domestic country would be:
COACOIt,D = 0, CI
ACOI
t,D =
¡
1− γACOI∗t
¢
RIFt .
Since
¡
1− γACOI∗t
¢
=
¡
1− γNC∗t
¢
, the volumes of inflows would be the same as the case NC,
CIACOIt,D = CI
NC
t,D , and so do the amounts of loanable fund and equity fund: S
ACOI
t,D = S
NC
t,D =¡
1− αIt
¢
wtN +
³
1− αIMt,DD
´
RIDt +
¡
1− γACON∗t
¢ ³
1− αIM∗t,FD
´
RIFt , and IACOIt,D = I
NC
t,D = α
I
twtN +
αIMt,DDRI
D
t +
¡
1− γACOI∗t
¢
αIM∗t,FDRI
F
t . Consequently, the equity rate would remain the same as the
case before imposing controls, 1+ iE(ACOI)t+1,D = 1+ i
E(NC)
t+1,D , and the the values of α
IM∗
t,FD, α
IM
t,DD and α
I
t
do not change. Similar to case NC, when RIMt,FD > R
IM∗
t,FF + ξ
F
t , all foreign investors would re-invest
in the domestic country, γACON∗t = 0, and capital inflows would change to CIACONt,D = RI
F
t .
Banking Crises At the time of the adverse shock (εt), the financial intermediaries face the
liquidity shortfalls SFt . By offering the deposit rate
³
1 + iD(ACOI)t
´
> 1 to attract the deposit
from the young, the financial intermediaries could overcome SFt and prevent immediate bank runs
when SACONt,y ≥ SFt. Then it depends on the expected return rate and the loan rate to overcome
the liquidity shortfalls at the following period t+ 1, SFACOIt+1 ,and to prevent the banking crises at
period t+ 1.
When RIM∗t,DF ≥ RIMt,DD + ξDt , and SACOIt,y = SFt, the available loanable fund after paying SFt
becomes
SACOIt,F − SFt =
¡
1− αIMt
¢
γˆACOIt RI
D
t ,
7The reason why volumes of the flows is restricted by the domestic controls is because

1− γˆACOIt

<

1− γ˜ACOIt

.
When

1− γˆACOIt

>

1− γ˜ACOIt

, the volumes of flows would be restricted by the foreign countrols.
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where
³
SACOIt,F − SFt
´
>
³
SNCt,F − SFt
´
. According to equation (19), min
³
1 + iloan(ACOI)t
´
<
min
³
1 + iloan(NC)t
´
. Compared to equation (11), when min
³
1 + iloan(ACOI)t
´
< max
¡
1 + iloant
¢
<
min
³
1 + iloan(NC)t
´
, the asymmetric capital controls again could overcome the liquidity shortfalls
at period t+ 1, which may not be achieved in the case without capital controls.
When RIMt,FD = R
IM∗
t,FF + ξ
F
t , and SACOIt,y = SFt, the available loanable fund after paying SFt
would change to
SACOIt,D − SFt =
¡
1− αIMt,DD
¢
RIDt +
¡
1− γACOI∗t
¢ ¡
1− αIM∗t,FD
¢
RIFt .
Since γACOI∗t = γNC∗t , SACOIt,D = S
NC
t,D . Similarly, when
³
1 + iD(NC)t
´
=
³
1 + iD(ACOI)t
´
and
SACOIt,D = S
NC
t,D < maxS
ACOI
t = maxSNCt [equation (21) with k = ACOI], the ability of capital
control in overcoming the liquidity shortfalls and in preventing banking crises is the same as the
case without capital controls. Under the circumstance where RIMt,FD > R
IM∗
t,FF + ξ
F
t , γACOI∗t = γNC∗t
and the conclusion remains the same.
Domestic controls on inflows vs. no foreign controls (ACIN) In this case, the domestic
country sets up the ceiling
¡
1− γˆACIN∗t
¢
<
¡
1− γNC∗t
¢
for each foreign investor and there is no
foreign controls. Under the circumstance where RIM∗t,DF = R
IM
t,DD+ξ
D
t , all foreign investors would re-
invest in the foreign country but only a fraction
¡
1− γACINt
¢
of domestic investors would re-invest
in the foreign country. The volumes of capital flows of the domestic country are:
COACINt,F =
¡
1− γACINt
¢
RIDt , CI
ACOI
t,F = 0.
Since γACINt = γNCt , the volume of capital outflows is the same as case NC, COACINt,F = CO
NC
t,F ,
and so do the loanable and equity funds, SACINt,F = S
NC
t,F =
¡
1− αIt
¢
wtN+γACINt
³
1− αIMt,DD
´
RIDt ,
and IACINt,F = I
NC
t,F = α
I
twtN + γACINt αIMt,DDRI
D
t . As a result, the equity rate and the values of
αIMt+1,DD and/or α
I
t+1 would remain the same as the case NC. In other words, the composition of
flows does not change after imposing controls on inflows in this case. Under the circumstance where
RIM∗t,DF > R
IM
t,DD + ξ
D
t , γACINt = 0, and the volume of capital outflow changes to COACINt,F = RI
D
t .
Under the circumstance when RIMt,FD ≥ RIM∗t,FF + ξFt , ∀ αIM∗t,F j ∈ [0, 1], j = D,F , all domestic
investors and a fraction
¡
1− γˆACIN∗t
¢
of foreign investors would re-invest in the domestic country.
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So capital flows of the domestic country would be:
COACINt,D = 0, CI
ACIN
t,D =
¡
1− γˆACIN∗t
¢
RIFt ,
where the volume of capital inflows is less than the case NC, CIACINt,D < CI
NC
t,D since
¡
1− γˆACIN∗t
¢
<¡
1− γNC∗t
¢
. Accordingly, the loanable fund and the equity fund reduced to SACINt,D =
¡
1− αIt
¢
wtN+³
1− αIMt,DD
´
RIDt +
¡
1− γˆACIN∗t
¢ ³
1− αIM∗t,FD
´
RIFt , and IACOIt,D = I
NC
t,D = α
I
twtN + αIMt,DDRI
D
t +¡
1− γˆACIN∗t
¢
αIM∗t,FDRI
F
t , which are less than the case NC, SACINt,D < S
NC
t,D and I
ACIN
t,D < I
NC
t,D . The
decrease in the equity fund would drive up the equity rate and increase the values of αIM∗t,FD, α
IM
t,DD
and αIt . That is, the composition of deposit would shift towards to the equity market.
Banking Crises At the time of the adverse shock (εt), the financial intermediaries face the
liquidity shortfalls SFt . By offering the deposit rate
³
1 + iD(ACIN)t
´
> 1 to attract the deposit
from the young, the financial intermediaries could overcome SFt and prevent immediate bank runs
when SACINt,y ≥ SFt. Then it depends on the expected return rate, the amount of demand deposits,
and the loan rate to overcome the liquidity shortfalls at the following period t + 1 and to prevent
the banking crises at period t+ 1.
When RIM∗t,DF = R
IM
t,DD + ξ
D
t , and SACINt,y = SFt, the available loanable fund after paying SFt
becomes
SACINt,F − SFt =
¡
1− αIMt
¢
γACINt RI
D
t ,
where
³
SACINt,F − SFt
´
=
³
SNCt,F − SFt
´
since γACINt = γNCt . According to equation (19),min
³
1 + iloan(ACIN)t
´
min
³
1 + iloan(NC)t
´
. Therefore, the ability of this asymmetric capital controls, ACIN to overcome
the liquidity shortfalls,SFACINt+1 , and to prevent banking crises is the same as the case NC. Similar
to case NC, when RIM∗t,DF > R
IM
t,DD + ξ
D
t , γACOIt = γNCt = 0 and SACINt,F − SFt = 0 which drives up
min
³
1 + iloan(ACIN)t
´
→ ∞. This means that the liquidity shortfalls at period t + 1 cannot be
overcome and bank will runs at the period t+ 1.
When RIMt,FD = R
IM∗
t,FF + ξ
F
t and SACINt,y = SFt, the available loanable fund after paying SFt
would change to
SACINt,D − SFt =
¡
1− αIMt,DD
¢
RIDt +
¡
1− γˆACIN∗t
¢ ¡
1− αIM∗t,FD
¢
RIFt ,
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where
³
SACINt,D − SFt
´
<
³
SNCt,D − SFt
´
. Equation (21) with k = ACIN shows that when³
1 + iD(NC)t
´
=
³
1 + iD(ACIN)t
´
and SACINt,D < maxS
ACIN
t = maxSNCt < SNCt,D , this asymmet-
ric capital controls could overcome the liquidity shortfalls and prevent banking crises, which cannot
be achieved in the case NC.
4 Discussion
The results of all cases are summaried in Table 1 and Table 2. Table 1 shows the results of the
circumstance where the expected foreign return rates are more attractive while Table 2 shows the
results of the circumstance where the expected domestic return rates are more attractive. In dif-
ferent circumstances, the financial intermediaries face different challenges to overcome the liquidity
shortfalls and to prevent banking crises. Since it is the demand deposits (saving accounts) that are
crucial to bank runs, the discussion will focus on the saving accounts (loanable funds).
In Table 1, when the expected foreign return rate is more attractive, the domestic country lose
the deposits to the foreign country. The lower amount of loanable fund would drive up the loan
rate in order to repay the demand deposits. However, the loan rate has its maximum value which
the entrepreneurs could accept. Therefore, any required loan rate which exceeds the maximum
loan rate means that no entrepreneur would apply for the loan. Without loan repayment at the
following period, the financial intermdiaries cannot repay the demand depsoits, and bank runs will
be the result. So in Table 1, it is the required loan rate which is compared to the maximum loan
rate and the loan rate in case NC to identify the ability to overcome the liquidity shortfals.
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RIM∗t,DF = R
IM
t,DD + ξ
D
t / RIM∗t,DF > R
IM
t,DD + ξ
D
t
Volumes Composition loan rate
Case COt : RIDt CIt i
E(k)
t+1,D max
¡
1 + iloant
¢
CL 0 0 αIMt+1,DD ↓
³
1 + iloan(CL)t
´
<
³
1 + iloan(NC)t
´
NC
¡
1− γNCt
¢
/1 0 − −/
³
1 + iloan(NC)t
´
→∞ > max
¡
1 + iloant
¢
SCCO
¡
1− γˆSCCOt
¢
0 αIMt+1,DD ↓
³
1 + iloan(SCCO)t
´
<
³
1 + iloan(NC)t
´
SCCI
¡
1− γ˜SCCIt
¢
0 αIMt+1,DD ↓
³
1 + iloan(SCCI)t
´
<
³
1 + iloan(NC)t
´
ACON
¡
1− γˆACONt
¢
0 αIMt+1,DD ↓
³
1 + iloan(ACON)t
´
<
³
1 + iloan(NC)t
´
ACOI
¡
1− γˆACOIt
¢
0 αIMt+1,DD ↓
³
1 + iloan(ACOI)t
´
<
³
1 + iloan(NC)t
´
ACIN
¡
1− γACINt
¢
/1 0 — —/
³
1 + iloan(ACIN)t
´
→∞ > max
¡
1 + iloant
¢
Table1. When expected foreign rate is relatively attractive: RIM∗t,DF ≥ RIMt,DD + ξDt .
As shown in Table 1, when the expected foreign return rate is relatively attractive, except for
case ACIN, both symmetric and asymmetric controls would affect the volume of capital outflows. It
is imporant to note that the volume of capital outflows would be restricted by the domestic country
when there is domestic capital controls on outflows. The volume of capital outflows, however, would
be restricted by the foreign country when there is no domestic capital control or when domestic
controls are on inflows. Regarding to the composition of the deposits, the decrease in capital
outflows due to the controls would increase both the loanable and the equity funds. Since the
deposit rate is pre-determined, the equity rate is the only rate which could reflect the change of the
amount of funds. The increase in the equity fund would reduce the equilibrium equity rate and
lower the fraction αIMt+1,DD which the domestic investors would place in the equity market at the
following period. Meanwhile, the changes on the volume of capital outflows and the composition
in case ACIN is the same as the case NC. In terms of the ability to overcome liquidity shortfalls
and to prevent banking crises, the cases with capital controls, except the case ACIN, require a lower
loan rate to meet the demand deposits, and are more likely to overcome the liquidity shortfalls and
to prevent banking crises than the case without controls. The case ACIN’s ability in overcoming
the liquidity shortfalls is the same as the case without capital controls.
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In Table 2, when the expected domestic return rate is more attractive, the domestic country
would receive the deposits from the domestic and the foreign investors. Provided the maximum
value of the loan rate, the amount of demand deposits which the domestic financial intermediaries
could afford has its maximum. Therefore, if the domestic financial intermediaries accept deposits
which are more than what they can afford, the bank runs will be the result. So in Table 2, it is the
amount of accepted deposits compared to the affordable deposits.
RIMt,FD = R
IM∗
t,FF + ξ
F
t /RIMt,FD > R
IM∗
t,FF + ξ
F
t
Volumes equity rate deposit
Case COt CIt : RIFt i
E(k)
t+1,D maxS
k
t
CL 0 0 αIM∗t+1,FD ↑ maxSNCt,D < maxSCLD
NC 0
¡
1− γNC∗t
¢
/1 − maxSNCt,D
SCCO 0
¡
1− γ˜SCCO∗t
¢
αIM∗t+1,FD ↑ SSCCOt,D < maxSSCCOt = maxSNCt < SNCt,D
SCCI 0
¡
1− γˆSCCI∗t
¢
αIM∗t+1,FD ↑ SSCCIt,D < maxSSCCIt = maxSNCt < SNCt,D
ACON 0
¡
1− γACON∗t
¢
/1 — SACONt,D = S
NC
t,D < maxS
ACON
t = maxSNCt
ACOI 0
¡
1− γACOI∗t
¢
/1 — SACOIt,D = S
NC
t,D < maxS
ACOI
t = maxSNCt
ACIN 0
¡
1− γˆACIN∗t
¢
αIM∗t+1,FD ↑ SACINt,D < maxSACINt = maxSNCt < SNCt,D
Table 2. When expected domestic return rate is relatively attractive: RIMt,FD ≥ RIM∗t,FF + ξFt
As shown in Table 2, when the expected domestic rate is relatively attractive, both symmetric
controls are effective in reducing the volume of inflows and in affecting the composition of inflows.
Except for case ACIN, the other two cases of asymmetric controls have no effects on either the
volume or the composition of capital flows.. Among the three cases which are effective in affecting
the volume and the composition of flows, the volume of capital inflows is restricted by domestic
controls in cases SCCI and ACIN, but it is restricted by foreign controled in case SCCO. The
decrease in the volume of inflows would lower the amount of equity fund and drive up the equity
rate at the following period. This increase in the equity rate would, in turn, shift the composition
of inflows towards to the equity market, and increase αIM∗t+1,FD.
Regarding to the ability to overcome liquidity shortfalls and to prevent banking crises, when
the domestic deposit rate offered in the open economy is higher than that in the closed economy,
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the amount of saving which the domestic financial intermediaries could afford in an open economy
is less than that in a closed economy, maxSNCt,D < maxS
CL
D . Compared to case NC, the cases in
which the controls are effective in affecting the volume and the composition of flows, such as SCCO,
SCCI, and ACIN, can overcome the liquidity shortfalls and prevent banking crises which case NC
cannot achieve. The ability of the economy in the cases in which the controls have no effects on
either the volume or the composition of flows perform the same as the case without controls in
terms of overcoming liquidity shortfalls and preventing banking crises.
Coming both tables, symmetric controls, whether both countries have inflows or outflows,
demonstrate the effectiveness on affecting both the volume and the composition of flows, regardless
of which country has a relatively high expected return rate. However, whether the asymmetric
controls are effective depends on which country has a higher expected return rate. Controls on
outflows are effective when the foreign country has a more attractive expected return rate while
controls on inflows are effective when the domestic country has a more attractive expected return
rate.
Most interestingly, the majority of cases with controls could overcome liquidity shortfalls and
prevent banking crises which the case without controls cannot achieve. To be more specific, when
the expected foreign return rate is relatively attractive, four out of five cases with controls could
perform better in terms of overcoming liquidity shortfalls. The only case which performs similarly
to the case without controls is the one controling on inflows asymmetrically. When the expected
domestic return rate is relatively attractive, there are three out of five cases with controls which
could perform better than the case without control in terms of overcoming the liquidity shortfalls
and preventing banking crises. The two cases which perform similarly to the case without controls
are the ones controlling output asymmstrically.
5 CONCLUSION & EXTENSIONS
Capital controls have been considered and adopted to protect the country from international finance
crises and to change both the volume and the composition of capital flows. This paper examines
capital controls on both outflows and inflows, and finds that capital controls on outflows and inflows
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may or may not achieve the objectives on changing the volume and the composition of capital flows.
Moreover, the ability of capital controls on protecting the economy from banking crises and sudden
stops is limited.
To be more specific, controls on capital outflows and inflows could both change the volume of
capital flows at the time when the controls are imposed. However, the ability of the controls on
changing composition of capital flows and to protect the country from banking crises and sudden
stops is limited. Taking controls on capital outflows as an example, composition of capital flows
would change only when one of the return rates has gone below the lower limits. Sudden stops
could be prevented when foreign banks run, but the domestic countries have remedied the liquidity
problems. Therefore, sudden stops can be prevented due to the remedy on liquidity problems, not
due to the controls on capital outflows. The controls on capital inflows could cause two opposite
effects on the return rates of the credit markets. When the two effects offset each other and leave
the return rates unchanged, the composition on capital flows may remain the same. Whether the
controls on capital inflows could prevent immediate bank runs and sudden stops depend on whether
the liquidity problems of the financial intermediaries can be overcome. To prevent future bank
runs, the financial intermediaries must provide the affordable rates, rather than competitive rates.
Therefore, it is not the capital controls on inflows that could protect the economy from sudden
stops, but the remedies that could overcome the liquidity problems.
There are several limitation of this paper, which can be extended in the future. The direct
extension is to discuss various types of capital controls together with different types of international
shocks, as well as contagion effects. Moreover, introducing currencies would allow the discussion
on currency risks, which capital controls could affect in some aspects.
.
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Figure 3: The decision making of the young individuals
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Figure 4: The decision making of middle-aged individuals
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